Defense Cooperation and Operational Flexibility: The Case for Bangladesh
By Tanvir Habib and Protno Prithu Biswas
August 2024 | Proceedings | Vol. 150/8/1,458
Situated on the tip of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is one of the fulcrum points of the Indo-Pacific. Boasting a large maritime space in an area removed from the intensity of the South or East China Seas, yet close enough to support varied needs of the operations in those regions, Bangladesh could be a key logistics node for the U.S. Navy. Its naval potential remains untapped, but the Bay of Bengal’s long maritime history provides a strong historical grounding. It can play a vital role in maritime operations in the broader Indo-Pacific as it overlooks major trade routes going through the strait of Malacca and is adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz. With India and Myanmar as its neighbors, Bangladesh has significant challenges in its naval domain. However, it has a vibrant shipbuilding industry and Bangladesh Navy-owned repair facilities could support U.S. naval assets during any conflict. Moreover, its naval bases potentially could be used either for logistical or, depending on the possibility of a defense agreement, in actual blockading operations supporting broader U.S. Navy goals in the Indo-Pacific region.
Strategic Positioning
Bangladesh’s primary naval bases overlook Myanmar’s Rakhine region and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s belt and road initiative aimed at lessening pressure on Chinese sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea. Cooperating with the Bangladesh Navy, the U.S. Navy could use those bases to observe Chinese projects. Moreover, Bangladesh’s strategic vantage at the top of the Bay of Bengal funnel could provide the United States with an advantage in guarding the Malacca Strait, which is vital to the Chinese economy and industry.
Bangladesh recently promoted the notion of a “Free and open Indo-Pacific” in its policy outline. However, the policy reflects its traditional foreign policy dictum: “Friendship to all and Malice toward none.” Bangladesh respects the sovereignty of all other countries, political independence, and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other nations. Thus, more engagement is necessary to incentivize Bangladesh toward a closer alignment choice that benefits U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
Bangladesh seeks the enhanced security of Indo-Pacific maritime sea lanes, crucial for maintaining its economy which is interconnected with the global economy. A large segment of global maritime oil shipments transit the Indian Ocean region, including those of U.S. treaty allies such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. Maintaining security in this region is essential not only for Bangladesh and its economy, but also for the U.S. Navy.
In developing the Indo-Pacific Outlook, Bangladesh recognized the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation, responding to maritime crises, and carrying out search-and-rescue operations in compliance with international conventions, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While this clearly aligns with the rules-based order that the U.S. Navy seeks to enforce, the lack of clear alignment and the absence of concurrent maritime strategy and doctrinal documents reveal a slow-moving and risk-averse strategy.
The Bangladesh Navy
It must be noted that the recently articulated Indo-Pacific Outlook echo the policies of the United States for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Aside from policy, Bangladesh has a moderately powerful navy and naval bases in the region. The Bangladesh Navy has undergone rapid modernization in recent years and has purchased significant U.S. and European equipment that has bolstered its capabilities. With the development of indigenous Link-22 standard Data Link, known as Bangla-22, and Western training and aspirations to model itself after Western navies, the Bangladesh Navy could be easily integrated into broader Indo-Pacific operations after proper interoperability exercises and operational changes.
In recent years, Bangladesh has increased its maritime security capability by purchasing submarines from China. In 2016, Bangladesh received two Ming-class submarines from China. Though the designs are older, these submarines are effective for training, capacity building, and area-denial roles. Bangladesh also is in the process of constructing a naval base with submarine berthing and aviation facilities, further enhancing its maritime capabilities with Chinese assistance and loans. It is the lack of access to Western platforms and financing that has driven Bangladesh to source the submarines from China. If proper financing, technology, and platform support were offered, Bangladesh could be a potential candidate for modern Western diesel-powered conventional attack submarines.
The Bangladesh Navy also has a significant number of frigates, corvettes, and large patrol ships. Guided-missile frigates and corvettes are designed for antisubmarine warfare and are equipped with advanced armaments, including an FM-90N short-range air defense missile system, torpedo tubes, naval guns, machine guns, and aviation facilities for antisubmarine warfare helicopters. Large patrol crafts (LPC) play a significant role in Bangladesh’s naval fleet, enhancing its maritime defense and surveillance capabilities. These vessels are designed to operate in various naval warfare scenarios, including air, surface, and subsurface operations. LPCs are integral to Bangladesh’s maritime defense strategy, safeguarding its exclusive economic zone, conducting search-and-rescue operations, protecting natural resources, and enforcing maritime laws in the region. The United States should consider other similar equipment that could enhance Bangladesh's naval combat capabilities.
Bangladesh also has U.S. Coast Guard cutters and the modernization plans outlined in the Forces Goal 2030 would have transformed the surface fleet with modern platforms based on Western designs and philosophy. Recent years have seen a significant slowdown of the naval modernization drive but a fresh injection of interest by the U.S. Navy, backed by a proper support package, could incentivize rapid movement on this front.
The United States would benefit from joining the Bangladesh Navy in its modernization effort by providing it with training and by selling them U.S. equipment and technology. These would enhance Bangladesh’s maritime security partnership with the United States and enhance mutual dependency. Moreover, the U.S. Navy could increase the number of its naval drills with Bangladesh involving varied degrees of complexity and spanning multiple domains to further provide that country with important operational experience and enamor them to the U.S. Navy.
Logistics and Safe Harbor
During any potential conflict, Bangladesh’s naval bases could be a hub for logistics and a safe harbor for the U.S. Navy. The United States currently has no bases in the Bay of Bengal. While Diego Garcia Island will certainly be a logistics hub for operations in the Indian Ocean, Bangladesh—with its manpower, vibrant shipbuilding industry, and a professional navy—could offer U.S. Navy ships a place for rest, recuperation, and rearming. Bangladesh currently is building a deep seaport in Matarbari, Cox’s Bazar with the assistance of Japan, one of the most trusted and important U.S. allies since World War II. Japan could help build a bridge between these two countries to ensure that the USN could use Matarbari deep-sea port as a naval operations base during any future war by blockading potential Chinese shipments that bypasses the Malacca to use CMEC as an alternative. This would provide the United States leverage against China in the Bay of Bengal region.
Smaller countries are often more interested in a close-knit relationship with bigger powers to offset the power imbalances they face when dealing with potential adversaries. With China firmly on the side of Myanmar as evident by the Rohingya refugee crisis, Bangladesh could provide the United States with an opportunity to establish a long-term partnership as a counter to China-dominated Myanmar. Along with potential base facilities, Bangladesh is also a vibrant and aspiring democracy. This aligns with the United States’s global value-based order as long as Bangladesh retains its democratic credentials. Bangladesh’s location also has the potential to allow U.S. long-range ISR advantages over China by creating pressure on not only the Tibetan front, but also on Yunan.
Bangladesh can be one of the most effective partners for the United States in the Indian Ocean and the United States would benefit from a cordial relationship with it.